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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

The Concept of Consciousness. By EDWIN B. HOLT. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1914.—pp. xiv, 343.

This volume, the author tells us, was written in 1908, and is now published, nearly six years later, without alteration. It appears, therefore, to be, in date of composition, the earliest American book devoted to the exposition and defence of the 'new' or monistic realism. The delay in its publication is to be regretted—unless, perhaps, by neo-realists of another *nuance*. For the volume throws a good deal of light upon some of the logical motives which helped to generate this now flourishing movement; it comes nearer than anything yet printed to giving us a 'system' of neo-realism; and its reasonings are assuredly of the highest significance, if they are sound. For they attempt not merely, like all expressions of radically monistic realism, to dissuade mankind from the use of certain ways of thinking to which it has long been habituated, but also to establish, in the place of these, an entire, new, connected scheme of fundamental categories for the interpretation of the nature of things, of consciousness, of the distinction between mental and physical, and of truth and error. The plain man is little likely to gain from these pages a conviction that he has been a neo-realist all his life without knowing it. Professor Holt seems, it is true, to imagine that he is presenting "a realism of perhaps a thoroughly naïve sort"; and he proclaims in his preface an intention of avoiding system-mongering, of "grounding philosophy in facts" and keeping "close to the mundane fabric." But such an announcement is a kind of thundering in the index which most philosophers nowadays appear to think necessary, but which the experienced reader has learned not to take too seriously. In reality, Mr. Holt's method is boldly dialectical—as dialectical as that of Hegel. And the conclusions to which it brings him have a much closer affinity to the realism of the Platonic dialogues than to the physical realism of the average man of science.

The volume contains, it is true, much that will be read with satisfaction by all dissenters from epistemological dualism, and propounds some arguments which will perhaps be welcomed by many who, without sharing the rest of Mr. Holt's philosophy, share his rage against the theory of representative ideas. To that theory the author

apparently finds it impossible to refer without falling either into a certain vehemence or else into a vein of sarcasm which, as an unconverted but by no means fanatical adherent of the hypothesis in question, I cannot profess always to find extremely mordant. The belief that there exist such things as ideas, which are the media of our knowledge about other existences, is after all an old and natural view, long held by many very respectable intelligences; though it has its undeniable difficulties, it has owed its currency to certain entirely definite and pertinent considerations, of which Mr. Holt betrays a better understanding than some other epistemological monists. I do not see, therefore, why the reasons for and against it should not be discussed in a tone of comparative calm.¹

The book contains one argument—original, I think, with the author—which, in his eyes, makes the establishment of the general monistic thesis of the ‘numerical identity of object and percept’ a very simple matter indeed. The argument consists merely in the discovery of the meaning of identity. The concepts of representation, of similarity and of identity are regarded by the author as equivalent in their positive signification. Representation means similarity, and “similarity is partial identity” (p. 148). One object “represents another” by being, in some specified respect, “identical with the thing it represents.” Thus a photograph, “in so far as it represents an object, is just so far identical with it. Likewise a sample of cloth represents the web in so far as it has the exact colour, texture and thickness as [*sic*] the rest of the web. If it has not these identical, it is not a fair sample or true representation” (p. 143). When the notions

¹ The implication of the dualistic theory which the author regards as most “monstrous” and “ridiculous” of all is not easily distinguishable from a view which he has himself expressed in his paper in *The New Realism*. In 1908 he writes with great contempt of the notion that “our firm old universe is a colourless, soundless, smell-less, tasteless and touchless desert of time, space, masses and energies: the colours, sounds, *etc.*, being secondary qualities sensed within our skulls” (p. 137). This supposition he finds to be a mere misinterpretation of the fact that the physical sciences happen to have limited themselves, for their special subject-matter, to the movements of masses in time and space. This realm, however, is no more “real” or more “objective” than “the original world which was all of this together with all of the secondary qualities” (p. 133). In 1912, however, Mr. Holt appears,—if I understand him,—to maintain that the differences of sensible qualities are *in fact* reducible to differences in the time-density of vibrations, and that, in so far as they do not present themselves as such, but as “distinct qualities in their own right,” this is due to intra-corporeal factors. Yet the author’s sarcasm at the expense of any view of this sort is permitted to stand in the earlier-written but later-published volume. The apparent inconsistency is probably due to a confusion in the author’s thought to be noted subsequently in this review.

of identity and similarity are thus made interchangeable, the refutation of the hypothesis of representative ideas proves singularly easy; as the author remarks, "if anybody has ever assented to the representative theory of knowledge, it is only because he has not examined the concept of representation"—and at the end of his examination arrived at the author's definition. Accept that definition, and it must be plain that even a so-called 'mental representation' can not be a duplicate of an object but must be identical with it. "If a sensation or an idea represents anything else, whether this be an object or an absolute God's idea, it is so far identical therewith." True, our so-called ideas "are never completely identical with the objects." Hence it is that "we have become wedded to the phrase—my thought is *of* an object—when we ought to say and mean—my thought is a portion of the object—or better still,—a portion of the object is my thought:—exactly as a portion of the sky is the zenith" (p. 149). If our representations were adequate, the identity would extend to the whole of the object; thus "an adequate idea of a year would be a year long." It would seem to follow that even a semi-adequate one would be six months long. And would an adequate idea of the year 1908 exist six years ago—and a partially adequate one three years ago?

By means of the same conception, Mr. Holt refutes another current belief based upon dualistic presuppositions—*viz.*, that no person can experience another's pain or pleasure. Two persons, he observes (p. 109), can admittedly experience the same *kind* of pain, of the same intensity. Even so, the dualist is permitted to object, "it will still be a different pain, because experienced by different persons." The author replies that, at the moment, the persons can be differentiated only by differences in their experiences—*e. g.*, in their pains; but these pains, in the case supposed, cannot "be distinguished, psychologically or otherwise, from one another in so far as they are mere qualities." Hence we have no ground for the assertion that the two persons "experience different pains." (The author curiously neglects to draw the other, equally obvious inference from his premises, that the persons are to the same degree identical.)

It seems scarcely necessary to point out the confusion of ideas here. Similarity may, if one chooses, be defined as qualitative identity; but this concept is entirely distinct from that of numerical or existential identity. Two copies of Mr. Holt's book are as nearly alike as it was possible for his printer to make them; but if the printer had been a hundred times more successful in giving uniformity to his output,

the two volumes would not have come a whit nearer identity. But the author, apparently with no sense of jolt, passes from the partial qualitative identity of object and percept—which nobody, I suppose, denies—to the assertion of their numerical identity—which is the real point at issue; and thus by the baldest of paralogsms triumphantly refutes representationism on purely *a priori* grounds. This procedure is the more surprising because, elsewhere in the book—when the author is not engaged in overthrowing dualism—much emphasis is given to the contentions (a) that “a universal is capable of numberless repetitions” (p. 43)—*i. e.*, that the participation of particulars in a common essence in no wise makes of them identical existences; and (b) that position in a system is the real principle of individuation, and that the space and time systems are “the great individuator” (p. 44). It has, of course, been precisely the argument of the epistemological dualist that perceptual content can not, at least in all cases, be identical with the assumed real object, for the reason that it often does not exist at the same time, or in the same place, or in the same ‘public’ spatial system, or even in the same sense. But the dualist will have not the least reluctance in admitting the “identity” of content and object in the only sense in which Mr. Holt offers any evidence of that identity—namely, in the sense of partial resemblance. If “images” are *only* “as essentially identical with a certain portion of the concrete objects studied as the engineer’s designs are with the concrete, particular ship or trestle that is constructed in accordance with them”—and it is to this that the author’s ‘monism’ finally reduces (p. 271)—then it is a blessing, not a curse, upon dualism that Mr. Holt has pronounced. The doctrine of representative images could hardly be more unequivocally expressed.¹

But the features of the book thus far mentioned are merely variations on the usual themes of epistemological monism; they do not make manifest the distinctive character of Mr. Holt’s philosophy. That can perhaps best be brought out by noting the peculiar rôles played in his doctrine by three concepts, (1) that of “being,” (2) that of “neutral entities,” and (3) that of deduction.

1. It is in the pure notion of Being, Mr. Holt holds, that philosophy should find its starting-point; and it is this opinion which both furnishes the chief grounds, and determines the special coloring, of his realism. Like Hegel, he feels that, in the words of the *Smaller*

¹ The same rather amazing confusion between numerical and qualitative identity characterized also the author’s contribution to *The New Realism*, and was pointed out by the present reviewer more than a year ago, in some comments on that volume (this REVIEW, XXII, p. 413).

Logic, "all doubts and admonitions which might be brought against beginning the science with abstract, empty being will disappear, if only we perceive what a beginning naturally implies." For 'being,' in the logician's or mathematician's sense, is "the one quite universal predicate" (p. 46), the "fundamental category" which "includes all entities and processes whatsoever" (p. 20). It has, in short, an infinite denotation; there is no negative class corresponding to it (*ib.*). Since it applies to every possible term and proposition—or at least, as the author seems to qualify, to every term that is not meaningless because self-contradictory, to all that is not mere "printer's ink"—it obviously can "connote nothing"; "nothing can be predicated of it," and consequently "nothing can be deduced from it" (p. 96). This notion must, of course, not be confused with such concepts as 'reality' (p. 49), or 'physical existence' (p. 65), or 'independent being' (p. 47), or 'truth' (p. 70). All these have definite connotation, and therefore limited denotation; their negatives also 'are.' The realm of logical being, for example, contains the unreal as well as the real, the content of false as well as that of true propositions. Even the subjects of propositions which negate being—propositions which would seem to be logically possible—must be held to 'be' (p. 67). Similarly, of course, 'being' is to be ascribed to both sides of a contradiction (p. 69).

Unlike Parmenides, Mr. Holt, though he begins with 'being,' does not end with it; he professes to derive from this seemingly barren abstraction various philosophical consequences of moment. One of the easiest and most obvious of these, he finds, is a refutation of idealism. This follows in two ways, of which the first is of a delightful simplicity. The idealistic thesis, "All that is, is mind or idea," cannot possibly be true—so the author argues—for the evident reason that 'mind' and 'idea' are terms having more connotation, and therefore less denotation, than the term 'being.' The predicate of the idealist's thesis has determinate import, and it is therefore incapable of application to all "entities"; for the only predicate which permits such universal application is the one which has no meaning! "The fabric of idealism is reared upon a set of pseudo-fundamentals. The simple entities of logic are more fundamental than the pseudo-simples of idealism, and logic offers a more thoroughgoing analysis of the world of experience than does idealism" (p. 23). "In short, subjective idealism is a false doctrine because mind is really something, and hence everything it cannot be" (p. 97). This triumph of dialectic the author is unwearied in repeating (*e. g.*, pp. 20, 78, 82, 94, 102).

He also, however, intimates another disproof of idealism, equally based upon the notion of 'being.' The new symbolic logic, we are told, "has cast by no means a favorable light upon idealism"; for it has shown "that logic is not the science of 'correct thinking' merely, but that it is a science of what *is*," that, in the words of Mr. Russell, "the object of a thought, even when this object does not exist, has a Being which is in no way dependent upon its being an object of thought" (p. 3). In short, every proposition "implies the being of its terms" (pp. 64-67).

In reading the first of these arguments, it is hard to repress a suspicion that the author is playing a practical joke upon a section of the philosophical public, is presenting a clever caricature of the abuses of the dialectical method. Quite apart from the logical peculiarities of the argument, it is, surely, not easy to take seriously discussions relating to a term which confessedly "has no connotation"—which, in short, means nothing at all,—of which "nothing can be predicated" and "from which nothing can be deduced." None of the flights into the inane imputed to the Schoolmen seem to me quite equal to this. But it is perhaps the duty of a reviewer to assume that even this reasoning is soberly meant, and to point out explicitly what seem to him the fallacies in it. The reviewer is, in that case, confronted with an embarrassment of choice. One might, for example, note that the logical sum of this objection to idealism amounts precisely to this: that the idealist has asserted a significant proposition, that he attributes to all reality a predicate which has some concrete meaning. Since no idealists, I suspect, have ever meant to do otherwise, they, at least, will not find the charge a hard one to bear. But the most pertinent remark to be made upon the author's argument here is that it is, at best, irrelevant. Granting Mr. Holt full freedom to make what use he will of his concept of 'being,' the whole issue between any significant form of realism and of idealism lies on the hither side of that abstraction. It is with the questions of 'reality,' of the 'physical existence' of all sensible content, of the 'truth' of certain propositions, of the 'independent being' of certain concrete entities, that the controversy is concerned. Not only are these, as the author himself insists, different questions from that of 'logical being'; they are also questions with respect to which nothing can be inferred from the fact that everything that we can in any way refer to may be said to have such logical being—*i. e.*, to be, at least, something that can be referred to.

The second of the refutations of idealism mentioned seems to in-

volve an ambiguity. In so far as the 'being' of terms, which recent logic is said to have found implied in all propositions, is merely 'being' in the sense—or absence of sense—already considered, the remarks made upon the former argument apply also to the second. But the author seems often to mean something more definite when, in this connection, he ascribes being to the entities which symbolic logic investigates. He means, namely, that those entities have a certain stubbornness and recalcitrancy. A term in a given system has relations to other terms which the logician does not create, but merely discovers. "Mathematics has always dealt with something that clearly is more than the mathematician's mere thought, with something, that is, which either is so or not, and is inexorably the one or the other" (p. 3). "The seemingly more pliant entities of logic and mathematics offer the same inexorable resistance to any merely subjective familiarities as do the concrete masses and forces of the physicist." "We build to ourselves a number system by the 'merely subjective act of counting,' as some one has impiously said; but we discover that that number system is infinitely more than we had ever desired or imagined" (p. 119). Here clearly, then, 'being' means inflexibility towards any "subjective familiarities," the property by which conceptual relations and logical laws are independent of the wish or intent of any individual mind. 'Being,' in this sense, it should be noted, can no more be a "universal predicate" than can the idealist's "consciousness," according to the implications of the author's reasoning already mentioned. For inflexibility is a term of positive connotation; and over against it we can always distinguish, in our universe of discourse, things that are, or might be, not inflexible. If, in fact, one chose to follow the example of Mr. Holt's dialectical method, one might argue thus: The difference between things objective and things subjective is here identified by the author with the difference between things that are, and things that are not, independent of our design or desire. But, since 'independence,' in this sense, is not the "universal predicate," a class of entities which are *not* so independent must be said to 'be.' *Ergo*, 'subjective' as well as 'objective' entities *are*—and dualism is thus once more vindicated!

However, this second argument, when 'being' is taken in the second, more definite, sense, is one of the recognized bases of that logical realism which Mr. Holt shares with a number of contemporary philosophers. It seems to me, none the less, highly unsuccessful as a refutation of idealism—a doctrine for which, in the epistemological sense of the term, I hold no brief. The argument is, in fact, identical

in principle with Dr. Johnson's celebrated refutation of Berkeley: "Sir, I refute him thus!" said he, kicking the stone by the roadside. Even Mr. Holt seems to see in this, what it has always been recognized as being, merely an amusing illustration of the great critic's philosophical *naïveté*. Since the idealist did not deny that physical masses, as contents of experience, are "inexorable," and did not mean by their being "in the mind" either their conformity to human desires or the predictability of their behavior, you did no harm to his doctrine by pointing out that they are in fact inexorable, and often disagreeable and unforeseeable. You do just as little harm to it by pointing out that logical entities have analogous properties. What the idealist has maintained is merely that all real existences 'are' in a certain, particular manner, that they occur exclusively in a certain context or type of relation. Even the most extreme neo-Kantian, in his talk about the mind's 'creating' the categories and logical laws, never seriously means more than that it 'finds them' *in itself*, and sees them to be logically grounded in its own nature.

2. Whatever it be for things to have 'being,' the things that are, are upon final analysis, Mr. Holt finds, to be described as "neutral entities." One could have wished for a more formal and precise definition of a term to which the author seeks to give so prominent a place in the philosophical vocabulary. The reader will experience some difficulty in piecing together the elements of a definition offered in various places in the volume. Certain expressions used, for example, would seem to indicate that "neutral entity" and "being," in its first and most abstract sense, are synonyms. For we are told that the adjective "neutral" has "the royal sinecure of universal predicate" (p. 114). But there can not, according to the author's reasoning, and in the sense specified, be two universal predicates. And therefore "neutral" and "being" should be merely different printer's ink for the same concept. Yet with this interpretation other passages conflict. For example, the author is at pains to offer an extended proof that matter is really a neutral entity. But no proof can be needed that matter has "being." The latter predicate is by hypothesis applicable to all things that can be mentioned (though not to these only!); its definition, so far as it can be said to have any, consists merely in the universality of its denotation. It is self-evident, then, that it must be applicable to any particular entity or class of entities. Again, we are told that anything is sufficiently proved to be "neutral" if it is "common to us all, as are leagues and fathoms, day and night" (p. 110). But if Mr. Holt

affirms "common to us all" as a "universal predicate," he is once more doing what he so often reproaches the idealist for doing; he is applying to the entire realm of logical being a predicate which has a concrete connotation, and an abstractly conceivable or mentionable negative class of entities over against it—that of beings "not common to all." In short, if neutrality is something, everything it cannot be.

It appears, in fact, impossible to reconcile all the things that are said about neutral entities. There remains, however, a residuum of somewhat significant and coherent statements respecting them. When these are put together, the result is a metaphysical theory which, as I have intimated, may best be described as a species of Platonic realism, worked out in a new way and with some highly original details. Neutral entities are "such stuff as logical and mathematical manifolds are made of" (p. 114); they consist of terms and propositions, but not in any psychological or subjectivistic sense of those expressions. The author has, as he says, learned from Professor Royce the truth of "the conceptual nature of the universe," but "this verity" to him "argues not for idealism but for realism" (p. xiii). Neutral entities, therefore, are neither mental nor physical; it is this consideration, apparently, which explains the name given them. On the other hand, minds and "ideas," and likewise matter, are merely specific complexes of such entities. The author thus reaches a sort of metaphysical monism—a doctrine of "one [kind of] substance, of which mind and matter are two aspects,"—which seems to him to accord well with his professedly monistic epistemology. In point of fact, as it is worked out, it involves a negation of epistemological monism, though the fact is obscured by the pervasive confusion of correspondence with numerical identity. Cognition is, as men have commonly held, a case of correspondence; but it is not a correspondence between "ideas" and "things-in-themselves," but "between two neutral manifolds" which possess a "complete identity of substance" (p. 126). But since "identicals can be, and are, repeated" the neutral manifold commonly called an idea is apparently *not* regarded by the author as *numerically* one with the neutral manifold commonly called the object of that idea; it is a "repetition" of it. In the epistemological sense, this is an obviously dualistic view.

In its bearing upon physical science, the theory of neutral entities means that, even upon such a question as the ultimate constitution of matter, the last word must be said by the mathematical logician, not by the physical chemist. When the biologist has analyzed organisms into the chemical compounds of which they are made up, and the

ordinary chemist has analyzed these down to their elemental atoms, and the physical chemist has resolved these "into minuter components (motions, masses, electrons)," it still remains for logic to analyze these last, still relatively complex, units into simpler and ever simpler neutral entities. And in this passage from physical to logical analysis, from the division of masses to the resolution of connotations, the author seems to perceive no breach of continuity. At bottom, it would appear, matter is of an atomic constitution, but its atoms are not spatial indivisibles but logical simples, quiddities floating in the void; their concurrence, by which a world is generated, consists in their uniting to form propositions.

At this point the author is confronted by an old and obvious difficulty: How *can* logical simples, without loss of their simplicity, unite in a diversity of relations? Must not any conceptual realism of this sort end, as in Herbart's case, in a reduction of all the concrete relations of things to *zufällige Ansichten* and a denial of the reality of change? Much of Mr. Holt's reply to this difficulty (pp. 25-30) seems to me to wander off into kindred but not strictly relevant issues. But for the adequate discussion of the point, not to say, of the entire metaphysical theory of neutral entities, more space would be requisite than this review can properly claim. I must therefore limit myself here to mere exposition.

3. There remains to be noted, however, a large further contention. The neutral entities are not only related, but are in all probability, Mr. Holt believes, linked together as are the members of a deductive sequence, the more complex being deductively derived from the more simple; and since it is these entities that make up the universe, "all being is a single infinite, deductive system" (p. 164). And by deduction is meant "the logical necessity with which consequences follow from premises" (p. 12), though such necessity, it is maintained, may be as truly exemplified in the deduction of *novel* consequences, not "given" in the premises, as in the barren circularity of the syllogism. Here, manifestly, the neo-realistic world appears with a highly Spinozistic coloring—which some other new realists, no doubt, will regard as not properly belonging to it. The author himself puts this third thesis forward, not as "perfectly assured," as the two former are, but as something which "as our knowledge advances we have more and more reason to believe." The justification of this belief seems, however, to be an important part of his programme; the principal purpose of the book is, in fact, said to be "to give a deductive account of consciousness" (p. 166).

Unfortunately for the fulfilment of this purpose, the author's conception of deduction, when brought to the application, proves to be extremely fluctuating and equivocal. So far as consciousness is concerned, the "deductive account" of it that is offered consists chiefly, not in a deduction but in a reduction—an attempted proof that minds and their contents, including volitions, are composed of neutral entities. You do not deduce water with "logical necessity" from hydrogen and oxygen by showing it to result from the union of those two elements; nor is Mr. Holt's book deducible from the alphabet, though its words are all built up out of the 'entities' of that system. It is true, however, that some attempt is also made to work out an actual deductive order of entities, and to assign to 'consciousness' its place therein. But this turns out to be nothing more than a tentative arrangement of concepts in the order of their relative complexity. Manifestly, *if* the (connotatively) simpler and "more universal" entities are "more fundamental," and deductively necessitate the more complex, then to find the place of consciousness in "the hierarchy of simple-to-complex," *is* to deduce it from that more fundamental than itself. But what one requires is either a proof of the major premise, that if, of two 'entities,' one is logically simpler than the other, the latter—both as to its essence and its existence—is deducible from the former, or else an exhibition, in each particular instance, of a logical necessity linking together the successive members of the hierarchy, a deductive following of one *from*—and not merely after—another. But what is required is nowhere given. The nearest approach to it is, I believe, the following, which may be quoted as a favorable example of the author's "deductive" procedure:

"Then come the innumerable algebras—rather elaborated cases of order. About here, in the simple-to-complex series of neutral entities must appear the so-called 'secondary qualities,' more properly the qualities. This may seem very much forced, but that will be purely by reason of the traditional Locke-Cartesian psychology. I have tried to erase the *tabulae* in order that we may consider each and every entity for what it just logically *is*: and if we do this we see at once that *aside from their actual brute qualities* the colours, sounds, odours, *etc.*, have none but purely ordinal qualities. The colours, if we will examine them without prejudice, are not intrinsically even extended: but they are merely a rather simple ordinal system of several dimensions. The concept of intensity here appears. Next comes geometry" (p. 155; italics mine).

The mathematician, I can't but think, will learn with some surprise

that geometry is deduced from the concept of intensity; nor are we vouchsafed any hint as to how it is done. But with respect to the deduction of the sensible qualities from the class of entities next before them in the series, some explanation, it will be observed, is given. The immediately antecedent entities are types of order; and colors, *etc.*, are nothing but specific ordinal systems—if you disregard “their actual brute qualities.” In other words, if you leave out of account the essential differentia of the later member of your pair of concepts, the part of its meaning that is unique, you will, surprisingly enough, discover that what remains is *not* essentially different from the prior member. Thus it is that “there is no break in the series” and the deductive unity of all being is exemplified.

This facility in deductive prestidigitation appears to be made possible by the fact that the author is not really clear as to what ought to be the logical relation between successive members of a series of the sort that he is attempting to exhibit. For the most part he speaks of deduction as meaning the definition of the later entities “in terms of” the earlier and simpler and more “universal” ones. But this hardly seems sufficient for his purpose. For, in the first place, it does not give us—what the scheme appears to require—any actual logical necessity of the existence of the later entities or of their occurrence in any concrete system or universe. Triangles are defined in terms of lines and angles; it does not follow that in any system in which lines and angles occur, triangles *must* occur. *Mere* definition works backward; but the “deduction” which the author seems to crave is supposed to work forward. In the second place, the properties of a logically complex thing are not identical with those of the entities in terms of which it is defined. A triangle has properties not predicable of lines or angles; a regiment has properties which do not belong to the soldiers composing it. And the properties of the more complex thing are not *necessarily* deducible from the properties of the things mentioned in its definition—unless definition be confused with exhaustive description. It is perfectly conceivable that the complex will have both qualities and methods of action which can be ascertained only empirically and could never be deduced by a logical scrutiny of its *essentialia*. Once more, then, to define A in terms of B is not to “deduce” A, and all that distinguishes it, *from* B. In the third place, the world appears to be full of a number of “brute qualities,” not truly definable in terms of anything else whatever. This might, from Mr. Holt’s point of view, mean only that the number of logical simples is considerable, and includes such things as the

sensible qualities, as well as the more fundamental notions of mathematics and logic. But he is not content with this. If the world were such a large, promiscuous array of simples, it would lose that hierarchical order in which he delights, and would, as a whole, not at all present the character of a "deductive system." Mr. Holt therefore feels obliged to "deduce the qualities"; we have seen an example of the process. But in the present volume he never finds it quite possible to deny that, in the case of qualities, we do encounter "entities that do not seem to consist of the simpler entities that are more fundamental" (pp. 161-2). Since they are "deduced," all the same, it is evident that here deduction can *not* consist in definition of the thing deduced "in terms of simpler neutral entities present in the more fundamental parts of the complexity series."

It is true that Mr. Holt conjectures that "we may yet learn that qualities can be defined in terms of entities that are not qualities"; and it is probable that his paper in *The New Realism* was designed to give fulfilment to this hope. There too, however, as I have previously shown, there remains at the end of the reduction-process a small residuum of mere "brute quality" in the sensible attributes of physical things—a residuum which is acknowledged, and yet, as in the example which we have here seen, is conveniently disregarded in the final summing-up of the results.

It would be easy to exhibit many more impossibilities in the author's conception of a universe generating itself by a process of deduction of the complex from the simple. For a single further example: upon Mr. Holt's own showing this process could certainly never have got started. For manifestly the *Urgrossvater* of all the family of neutral entities should be none other than the concept of 'being,' which is of maximum simplicity and absolute universality. But from "this *fundamentum ultimum* nothing can be deduced" (p. 96). The family tree ascends to an ancestor who, when reached, is set down as childless.¹ But to heap up further illustrations of such contradictions would be an unprofitable use of space. Apart from its deductive pretensions, Mr. Holt's account of "consciousness" is of the usual neo-realistic type, now sufficiently familiar, which has been abundantly discussed on other occasions by the present reviewer.

¹ To speak strictly, all of the earlier ancestors must have been without issue. For Mr. Holt tells us that no terms—as distinguished from propositions—are logically "active," or generative of other terms by deduction. Yet most of his attempted deductions seem to be from one *concept* to another. And in this he is consistent with at least one of his principles; for propositions manifestly are not logical simples.

I have thought it necessary to devote the greater part of this review to pointing out some of the more fundamental of the confusions and inconsistencies which appear to me to pervade the author's reasonings. It ought to be said, however, that conceptual realism is one of the natural types of metaphysical hypothesis, but one which in modern philosophy has been a good deal less exploited than a number of others intrinsically no more promising. Mr. Holt, therefore, has done an interesting thing in giving us an unusually elaborate and ambitious example of the type. He has carried out his programme—as the foregoing has perhaps made evident—with an unusual degree of originality and metaphysical inventiveness, of boldness in speculative construction, and of resourcefulness in the devising of arguments in support of the positions taken. The book is written, also, in an uncommonly crisp, incisive and nervous style, which at times recalls that of Mr. Bradley. It is a pity, however, that so good a writer should so frequently speak of "hypothecating" a fact or a principle; extreme though his belief in the objectivity of logical entities is, it can hardly go so far as to imply that they are also negotiable securities.

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Benedetto Croce: La Filosofia di Giambattista Vico. Bari, Laterza e Figli, 1911.—pp. ix, 316.

The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico. By BENEDETTO CROCE. Translated by R. G. COLLINGWOOD. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1913.—pp. xii, 317.

Patriotism has led Italians to devote a great deal of attention to Vico; and the diverse schools of Italian thought, positivists, Hegelians, and adherents of the national Italian school, all claim Vico as their own, indulging in consequent controversies as to the proper way of interpreting him. Vico readily lends himself to such controversies because his was essentially an autodidactic, eclectic and unsystematic mind, so that everyone may pick out what he likes and interpret the rest to suit himself. (That this is not an unfounded statement, everyone can verify by reading Vico's catalogue of what his *New Science* is.)¹ Croce's book, however, is delightfully free from controversy and that philologic straining to produce the appearance of consistency which makes so many works on Vico, as on Kant, resemble in method the old-fashioned text books of gospel harmony. Instead of an apology, or, what is now so fashionable, an attempt at an 'objective' historical account of his author's thought, Croce boldly starts out to

¹ *Scienza Nuova* (2d ed.), Book II, Ch. II, § 2.